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Abstract
We compare, on the basis of a procedurally fair “provision point”
mechanism, bids for a public project from which some gain and some
lose with bids for a less eﬃcient public project from which all gain. In
the main treatment, participants independently decide which one, if
any, of the two public projects should be implemented. We also run
control treatments where only one project can be implemented. We
ﬁnd that (a) mixed feelings do not aﬀect bidding behavior, and (b) the
provision frequency of the project that raises mixed feelings declines
signiﬁcantly when it faces competition from the public good.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C92, D63, H44
Keywords: Public project, Bidding behavior, Procedural fairness
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 3641 686629; fax: +49 3641 686667.
Email address: levati@econ.mpg.de (M. V. Levati).
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 034“Quod ali cibus est aliis fuat acre venenum”
Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, Book IV, line 637
1 Introduction
There exists an impressive number of studies, both theoretical and experi-
mental, investigating the private provision of threshold public goods. These
are public goods that – once their cost, typically referred to as the provi-
sion point, has been met – cannot but be provided in their entirety (see,
e.g., Mark Bagnoli and Barton L. Lipman 1989; Mark Bagnoli and Michael
Mckee 1991; Melanie Marks and Rachel Croson 1998; Charles Bram Cadsby
and Elizabeth Maynes 1999; Charles Bram Cadsby, Rachel Croson, Melanie
Marks and Elizabeth Maynes 2008; Michael A. Spencer, Stephen K. Swal-
low, Jason F. Shogren and John A. List 2009). There is also work focusing
on public bad problems, usually described as commons, where individuals
exploit a commonly-owned resource yielding negative externalities (see, e.g.,
Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker 1994; James Andreoni 1995;
Roberto Burlando and John D. Hey 1997; Joep Sonnemans, Arthur Schram
and Theo Oﬀerman 1998; Erling Moxnes and Eline van der Heijden 2003).
As suggested by the idiom in our title,1 we consider threshold public
projects that raise mixed feelings, i.e., indivisible public projects from which
some parties beneﬁt, but others suﬀer. The Strait of Messina Bridge, which
is going to connect Sicily to mainland Italy, is an appropriate example. Some
people see the bridge as a job-creation scheme and a boost for the local econ-
omy; therefore, they attach a positive value to it or, to paraphrase our idiom,
they regard the project as “meat”. Others, however, are concerned about the
environmental impact of the bridge and its resistance to earthquakes; thus,
they attach a negative value to the project, that is they consider it to be
“poison”. Due to the heated controversy that surrounded the construction
of the bridge, the project was temporarily abandoned. Then, in March 2009,
the Italian government gave the ﬁnal go-ahead for it.
1The idiom corresponds to the English translation of the opening quote.
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sophical questions: should society require the unanimous consent of its mem-
bers in order to provide such projects, and if so, how could its individual
members exercise their veto power? On the basis of our procedurally fair
provision point mechanism, society members can prevent the realization of a
public project that raises mixed feelings by bidding suﬃciently low, or even
negatively. The provision mechanism is procedurally fair in the sense that
all parties are treated equally according to some objective criteria, namely
their bids, rather than according to their idiosyncratic (and usually privately
known) characteristics.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study of behavior in the
presence of public projects raising mixed feelings that relies on an axiomati-
cally derived and procedurally fair provision point mechanism. Yet, the rules
of the mechanism deﬁne only a game form. To implement it in the laboratory
we need to specify a proper game. We focus on the simplest possible scenario:
a public project that raises mixed feelings competes with a traditional public
good project, and society consists of two parties whose values of the projects
are commonly known.2 Both projects are indivisible and well speciﬁed, i.e.,
they can not be provided in part and their costs are predetermined and, we
assume, known to all. Both projects are eﬃcient, but the project that raises
mixed feelings is more eﬃcient than its alternative. Eﬃciency is measured
in terms of monetary surplus (i.e., the sum of the individual values attached
to the project minus its provision cost).3
Our principal objective is to examine whether the public project that
raises mixed feelings is provided in the face of competition from a public
good project that harms nobody but is less eﬃcient: in our main experi-
mental treatment, participants decide to provide either one or none of the
two projects. Which project, if any, is provided depends (given the projects’
costs) on the parties’ bids. If the sum of bids for each project suﬃces to cover
the corresponding cost, then the project that generates the larger surplus ac-
2Assuming two players dramatically reduces the set of equilibria (to be discussed in
Section 3) and allows for a clear-cut benchmark equalizing payoﬀs.
3Applying this eﬃciency criterion is justiﬁed because the provision mechanism allows
for monetary compensations.
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provided, and the parties’ payments are derived axiomatically.4 If, on the
other hand, the sum of bids for each project falls short of the corresponding
cost, then no project is provided and the parties’ payments are null.
In addition, we run control treatments where only one project is at stake
and the participants decide whether to provide it or not. The public project
that raises mixed feelings is expected to be nearly always provided in the
treatment where it constitutes the sole option. After all, it is eﬃcient and
the party beneﬁting from it can compensate the other party. A comparison of
bid levels and provision frequencies in this control and the main experimental
treatment allows us to determine whether and to what extent the provision
of a public project that raises mixed feelings is aﬀected by the availability of
an alternative project from which all beneﬁt.
Since our provision point mechanism has large sets of equilibria, the non-
provision of the project that raises mixed feelings may be attributed to coor-
dination failure. The treatment with the standard public good as the unique
option serves to control for this possibility: if bid levels and/or provision
frequencies in this and the other control treatment diﬀer, then we may infer
that “mixed feelings” impact behavior.
In the next section, we derive axiomatically the procedurally fair provi-
sion point mechanism that applies to our setting. Then we deﬁne the speciﬁc
experimental game and its solutions (section 3). After describing the experi-
mental protocol (section 4), we present the experimental ﬁndings (section 5).
In our conclusions (section 6) we summarize and discuss our results.
2 The procedurally fair provision point mech-
anism
Let P denote a nonempty ﬁnite set of indivisible and well-speciﬁed public
projects p, and let N = {1,...,n}, with n ≥ 2, be a group of bidders
4Obviously, if only one project generates surplus according to bids, then that project
is provided.
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denoted by C(p) ∈ R, is commonly known.5 Each player i submits a bid
plan bi = (bi(p) ∈ R : p ∈ P), resulting in a bid vector b = (b1,...,bn). For
each project p, we refer to the diﬀerence between the sum of the players’ bids
and its cost (that is
 n
i=1 bi(p) − C(p)) as the project’s surplus according to
bids. For all possible vectors b, the provision rule must specify, ﬁrst, which
p∗ ∈ P, if any, will be provided, and, second, which amount ci(b) ∈ R should
be paid by each player i.
We impose the following ethical or procedural fairness requirements.6
(A.1) “Equal payoﬀs according to bids” aﬃrms that if p∗ ∈ P is provided,
then
bi(p
∗) − ci(b) = bj(p
∗) − cj(b) ∀i,j ∈ N, and b.











i.e., the implemented project generates the maximal non-negative sur-
plus according to bids.
(A.3) “Balanced budget” requires that the individual payments ci(b) equal
zero if no public project is provided, whereas they add up to C(p∗) if
p∗ is provided. Formally,
ci(b) = 0 ∀i ∈ N if no public project is provided, and
 n
i=1 ci(b) = C(p∗) if p
∗ ∈ P is provided.
Thus, if there is no p ∈ P such that
 n
i=1 bi(p) ≥ C(p), no public project
is provided and ci(b) = 0 for all i ∈ N. If, instead, there exists a p∗ ∈ P
satisfying (A.2), then (A.1) implies bi(p∗) − ci(b) = ∆(b) for all i ∈ N.




i=1 ci(b) = n∆(b),
which employing (A.3) can be written as
 n
i=1 bi(p∗)−C(p∗) = n∆(b), where
5“Costs” could be negative, but we do not consider this case here.
6See Werner G¨ uth and Hartmut Kliemt (2011) for a more elaborate discussion of these
requirements.
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 n
i=1 bi(p∗) − C(p∗)
n
≥ 0. It follows that
ci(b) = bi(p
∗) − ∆(b) = bi(p
∗) −
 n
j=1 bj(p∗) − C(p∗)
n
for all i ∈ N. Hence, the procedurally fair provision point mechanism requires
the implementation of the project that generates the maximal non-negative
surplus according to bids, and that each bidder i pays ci(b). As the non-
negative surplus according to bids is equally distributed among all bidders,
nobody has to pay more than his bid, an essential veto requirement for a
liberal society.
For each player i ∈ N, let vi(p) ∈ R denote i’s true value of project p ∈ P.
An additional property of this mechanism is overbidding proofness, meaning
that any bid plan prescribing overbidding for a project (bi(p) > vi(p)) is
weakly dominated.7
So far we have deﬁned a game form. In the next section we specify a
proper game.
3 The experimental game
We focus on the simplest possible case: there are two players, N = {1,2},
and two public projects, P = {x,y}, whose costs C(x) and C(y) are pos-
itive. Project x implies true values v1(x) < 0 < v2(x). Consequently, its
implementation would yield mixed feelings. Project y is a normal public
good: 0 < v1(y) < v2(y). Both projects are assumed to be eﬃcient, that
is S(x) = v1(x) + v2(x) − C(x) > 0 and S(y) = v1(y) + v2(y) − C(y) > 0.
Furthermore, we impose S(x) > S(y), which obviously implies that v1(x) <
v1(y) < v2(y) < v2(x).8 The individuals’ true values and the projects’ costs
are commonly known.
We made a deliberate decision to have one player valuing both projects
7The provision point mechanism has therefore the nice property of satisfying the in-
dividual rationality condition. However, it is not incentive compatible because it is not
underbidding proof.
8If the project that raises mixed feelings were the less eﬃcient one, the choice between
the two projects would be unambiguous.
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form with the symmetry of the proper game. This may have rendered the
experimentally implemented game unfair. In this sense, our experiment can
be considered as a worst-case scenario for observing fairness in a procedurally
fair mechanism.
Each player i = 1,2 submits a bid vector bi = (bi(x),bi(y)). Bids are




, where b < v1(x) and b > v2(x). The provision
mechanism presented in Section 2 determines each player’s monetary payoﬀ
as a function of b = (b1,b2):
πi(b) =

         
         
0 if b1(x) + b2(x) < C(x) and b1(y) + b2(y) < C(y),
vi(x) − ci(x) = vi(x) − bi(x) +
b1(x)+b2(x)−C(x)
2
if b1(x) + b2(x) − C(x) ≥ max{0,b1(y) + b2(y) − C(y)},
vi(y) − ci(y) = vi(y) − bi(y) +
b1(y)+b2(y)−C(y)
2
if b1(y) + b2(y) − C(y) ≥ max{0,b1(x) + b2(x) − C(x)}.
A player that submits a negative bid for a project that gets implemented
is compensated by his fellow player; the latter’s bid has to be positive, con-
sidering that costs are positive and only projects with a non-negative surplus
according to bids are eligible for implementation.
If the minimum feasible bid, b, is suﬃciently below v1(x), there exist
many non-provision equilibria in which both bidders veto the two projects.
For this to hold, each player must submit bids that comply with
bi(p) < C(p) − vj(p) i,j = 1,2 (i  = j), p = x,y. (1)
In this case, if bidder j wanted to secure project p, he would have to overbid
and suﬀer a loss.9
Let us now turn to the provision equilibria, of which there exists an
abundance (like in standard provision point mechanisms). These equilibria
require individual bids that (a) result into a non-positive surplus according
9Note that in our experimental game the assumptions S(x) > 0 and v1(x) < 0 imply
that v2(x) > C(x). Thus, these assumptions rule out a non-provision equilibrium in which
both parties bid zero for both projects.
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Suppose, without loss of generality, that x is unambiguously provided in









2(x) = C(x), (2)
vi(x) − b
∗










i,j = 1,2 (i  = j). (4)
No player i (=1,2) has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from b∗
i(x)
because lowering his bid to b∗
i(x) − ǫ would endanger the project, while in-
creasing his bid to b∗
i(x) + ǫ would result in a payoﬀ loss of ǫ
2. Additionally,
condition (4) guarantees that the bids for the non-implemented project y do
not allow any player to proﬁt from replacing x with y.
The equality axiom (A.1) implies only equal payoﬀs according to bids.
It does not necessarily imply equal monetary payoﬀs. Within the set of
provision equilibria, the equilibrium that equalizes the two players’ monetary
payoﬀs for the selected public project constitutes an appropriate benchmark
for our analysis. Assume once more that x is implemented according to
b
∗. Imposing equality in the sense of v1(x) − b∗








C(x) + vi(x) − vj(x)
2
i = 1,2, i  = j.
If, instead, y is implemented according to b




C(y) + vi(y) − vj(y)
2
i = 1,2, i  = j.
General truth-telling (i.e., bi(p) = vi(p) for i = 1,2 and p = x,y) also
implies equal payoﬀs, but it does not qualify as an equilibrium because players
have an incentive to underbid.
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4.1 Treatments
We study three treatments that build on the basic game described and an-
alyzed above. In the main treatment, named M, pairs of participants bid
for public projects x and y, and implement the project that is more eﬃcient
according to bids, provided that its surplus according to bids is non-negative.
We also run two control treatments where just one public project (either x
or y) is at stake, and the relevant decision is whether to provide it or not.
We refer to the treatment where participants bid only for x as treatment X,
and to the treatment where they bid only for y as treatment Y . Player i’s





vi(x) − bi(x) +
b1(x)+b2(x)−C(x)
2 if b1(x) + b2(x) ≥ C(x),
0 if b1(x) + b2(x) < C(x).





vi(y) − bi(y) +
b1(y)+b2(y)−C(y)
2 if b1(y) + b2(y) ≥ C(y),
0 if b1(y) + b2(y) < C(y).
In both control treatments, there exists a continuum of provision equi-
libria where the two players satisfy condition (3) and bid collectively exactly
enough in order to meet the provision cost of the project.
Comparing the frequency of provision of x in treatments M and X allows
us to investigate whether bids for x are aﬀected by the presence of an alter-
native project. We are also interested in (i) diﬀerences in bidding behavior
between individuals who attach diﬀerent values to the projects, and (ii) how
these individuals exercise their veto power. In particular, who vetoes x more
often? The bidder that needs compensation, or the bidder that is obliged to
compensate his fellow player?
The non-provision of x in treatment X can be attributed either to the
9
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the non-provision of y in Y can be attributed only to coordination failure,
comparing the frequency of provision of x in X with the frequency of provision
of y in Y we can assess whether and to what extent the nature of the public
project per se aﬀects bidding behavior.
4.2 Experimental parameters
According to our parameterization, the players’ induced valuations of the
public projects were v1(x) = −40, v2(x) = 140, v1(y) = 40, and v2(y) = 80.
The valuations were expressed in terms of ECUs (Experimental Currency
Unit), with 5 ECU = e1. Bids could be any integer number between −200
and 200 ECUs. The cost of providing x, C(x), was 30 ECUs; that of providing
y, C(y), was 70 ECUs. Given these parameter values, the projects’ monetary
surpluses were S(x) = 70 and S(y) = 50.
The threshold below which player 1 (player 2) exercises his veto power
on the provision of x, as determined by (1), is b1(x) = −110 (b2(x) = 70).
The corresponding values for the players’ vetoes on y are b1(y) = −10 and
b2(y) = 30.
In treatment X, and whenever x is unambiguously implemented in M, the
equilibrium bids that equalize the players’ monetary payoﬀs (our benchmark
solutions) are b∗
1(x) = −75 and b∗
2(x) = 105, yielding u1(b
∗) = u2(b
∗) =
35. In treatment Y , and whenever y is unambiguously provided in M, the
equilibrium bids that equalize the players’ monetary payoﬀs are b∗
1(y) = 15
and b∗




The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Urs Fischbacher 2007) and con-
ducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics (Jena, Germany). The subjects were undergraduate students from
the Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena. They were recruited using the
ORSEE (Ben Greiner 2004) software. Upon entering the laboratory, the
subjects were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals.
10
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participants played each treatment exactly once within a given session.10 At
the beginning of each session, each participant was assigned the role of either
low-value bidder (player 1) or high-value bidder (player 2), a role which
he retained throughout the session. We implemented a so-called “perfect
stranger” protocol, which ensures that nobody meets the same person in
more than one treatment.
Each of the three treatments was presented separately in a diﬀerent part of
the experiment. Instructions (reproduced in the appendix) were distributed
and read aloud in each of the three parts, and participants had the chance to
go through a series of control questions and three practice periods.11 Once
the experimenter ensured that everyone understood the game, the corre-
sponding treatment started and subjects submitted their bids. Only after
all participants made their decisions were the instructions for the following
treatment distributed.
To minimize path dependence (i.e., dependence of current bids on previ-
ous outcomes), subjects did not receive any feedback or payment until the
end of the experimental session. At the end of the session, one treatment
was chosen randomly and subjects were paid according to their decisions in
that treatment.12 Subjects knew about these procedures in advance.
Instead of considering all possible permutations of our treatments, we
concentrate on treatment sequences where M is played either at the very be-
ginning or at the very end. The MXY and MY X sequences, which from now
on will be referred to as the MF sequences (F stands for ﬁrst), acknowledge
the potential importance of initial play (i.e., play that is uncontaminated by
other features). In the XY M and Y XM sequences, which from now on will
10One-shot games eliminate the possibility of strategic behavior that may exist in early
periods of ﬁnitely repeated games. Moreover, one-shot games are deemed to conform
better to ﬁeld conditions (e.g., Daniel Rondeau, William D. Schulze and Gregory L. Poe
1999; Spencer et al. 2009).
11The practice periods did not involve any interaction (the other’s decision was selected
randomly by the computer). Their sole aim was to familiarize the participants with the
game and its incentives (no payments were associated with them).
12This design should minimize confounding eﬀects among treatments and avoid subjects
averaging their earnings across games.
11
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that previous experience of the public projects might help people recognize
the relative eﬃciency of x compared to y.
We ran one session per sequence. Each session involved 32 participants
matched in pairs. With the bidders’ roles remaining constant throughout
each session, we had 16 low-value and 16 high-value bidders for each treat-
ment of any given sequence. Sessions lasted about 2 hours. Earnings ranged
from e2.00 to e42.00. The average earnings were e10.16 (inclusive of a
e5.00 show-up fee).
5 Results
Let us denote, for convenience, i’s bid for p in treatment T = {M,X,Y }
by bT
i (p), and check for the presence of order eﬀects, i.e., examine how bids
placed in the context of a certain treatment vary across the four sequences
of treatments that we consider. A series of rank-based tests reveals that bids
for x in treatments M and X, as well as bids for y in treatment Y , are not
aﬀected by the order in which the treatments are played.13 However, bids for
y in treatment M do exhibit order eﬀects.14 Nevertheless, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the bM
i (y) series in the XY M and Y XM sequences
are drawn from the same distribution.15 These results indicate that we can
pool our data only partially, that is we can pool them according to whether
M is played either at the beginning or at the end of the sequence.
How can we explain the observed order eﬀects? Figure 1 plots histograms
of the bM
i (y) values in the MF and ML sequences (64 observations per panel).
More than 20% of the observations are negative in the former case, whereas
13On the basis of the Brunner, Dette, and Munk test, we cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis that the four bM
i (x) series in the sequences that we consider have identical distributions
(p-value = 0.38). The same applies to the bX
i (x) and bY
i (y) groups of series (with p-values
equal to 0.56 and 0.45, respectively).
14The Brunner et al. test statistic is in this case signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
15The p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test equals 0.63. We compared as well bM
i (y)
in the MXY and MY X sequences with the aim of ﬁnding out whether recruitment was
unbiased. The p-value of the test equals 0.96 suggesting that randomization worked (i.e.,
the participants were suﬃciently similar).
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Figure 1: Histograms of the bM
i (y) bids in the MF and ML sequences.
none of them is negative in the latter. The distribution of bM
i (y) in the ML
sequences appears to be located on the right of the distribution of the same
series in the MF sequences (see also the descriptive statistics reported in the
fourth and eighth columns of Table 1). It seems that participants who have
experienced both public projects (irrespectively of the order in which they
were implemented) wish to increase the likelihood of providing y when both
projects are made available.16 In Section 5.1.2 we show that the order eﬀect
is mainly triggered by the high-value bidders.
5.1 Bidding behavior
In what follows we analyze how individuals place their bids on the two
projects. Table 1 reports summary statistics of bid levels in treatments M,
X, and Y (the data are partially pooled). In both panels, the bM
i (x) series
16Learning by the participants cannot account for bM
i (y) being higher in the ML than
in the MF sequences, as it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the bY
i (y) series
in the Y XM and MXY sequences have identical distributions (p-value = 0.34; two-sided
Wilcoxon rank sum test)
13
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Minimum −200.0 −200.0 −100.0 −150.0 −200.0 0.0 −80.0 −150.0
1st quartile −60.0 10.0 −60.0 20.0 −50.0 28.8 −50.0 30.0
Median 15.0 30.0 46.0 32.5 15.0 40.0 60.0 45.0
Mean 10.8 22.6 24.5 35.5 19.3 46.3 30.4 42.6
2nd quartile 100.0 45.0 100.0 56.2 100.0 60.0 100.0 60.0
Maximum 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 180.0 140.0
Std. deviation 98.4 55.3 87.2 43.2 83.9 30.9 80.4 34.1
Note: 64 observations per series (there are 32 participants in each session).
display the greatest variation17 and the lowest measures of location (mean
and median values).
Next, we examine whether bids for x are aﬀected by the availability of y.
Figure 2 compares kernel density plots of the observed bids for x in treat-
ments X and M, conditioned on whether M is played ﬁrst or last. For the
MF sequences, there is a gap between the M- and the X-treatment esti-
mates. Following the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the two distributions are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (two-sided test, p-value = 0.042). However, the as-
sumptions of the test appear to be violated.18 Thus, we are inclined to rely
on the binomial sign test, which employs less information than the Wilcoxon
test but is less demanding with regard to the nature of the distributions un-
der study. In the present case, the 95% conﬁdence interval for the sign test
statistic p contains 0.5, implying that there is no diﬀerence between the two
sets of bids.
The situation is clearer for the ML sequences: the kernel density estimates
are close (right panel of Figure 2) and the two tests yield consistent results
17The standard deviation of the bM
i (x) exceeds all others. In addition, no other series
displays a larger diﬀerence between maximum and minimum values, or a larger interquar-
tile range.
18It is doubtful whether the resulting diﬀerence scores could be drawn from a symmetric
population. In fact, tests that they are symmetric about an unknown median reject the
null hypothesis of symmetry at conventional levels.
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of bM
i (x) and bX
i (x) in the MF and ML
sequences.
(the p-value of the two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test equals 0.12, the 95%
conﬁdence interval of the sign test statistic is 0.34 to 0.65).
How do individuals modify their bids for x between treatments? In the
MF sequences, the majority of subjects either increase (42.2%) or do not
change (28.1%) their bids between treatments M and X. The rest of the
players (19 out of 64) lower their bids, about half of them by less than 10
ECUs. In the ML sequences, 39.1% of the participants bid the same amount
in both treatments. Switching from X to M, 19 participants increase their
bids by an average amount of 19.4 ECUs, and 20 participants decrease their
bids by an average amount of 53.7 ECUs (thus the overall eﬀect is negative).
In sum, participants bid less for x whenever it faces competition from y
(especially, when they are given the choice between x and y before having
to decide whether to provide x or not), but this diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
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Figure 3: Boxplots of bT
i (x), T = M,X, i = 1,2, in the MF and ML se-
quences (32 observations per boxplot).
5.1.1 Low-value and high-value bidders
What is the relationship between bM
i (x) and bX
i (x) for the subsamples of low-
value (i = 1) and high-value (i = 2) bidders? Figure 3 draws boxplots of bids
for x separately for each type of bidder. As expected, low-value (high-value)
bidders place predominantly negative (positive) bids. In addition, the bids
of both types of bidders are similar, both between treatments and between
sequences.
Actually, the hypothesis that the distributions of bM
1 (x) and bX
1 (x) are
identical cannot be rejected: the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
equals 0.29 for the MF and 0.90 for the ML sequences. The same applies
to the distributions of bM
2 (x) and bX
2 (x) for the MF sequences (p-value =
0.14), and, once we acknowledge the presence of certain outliers, the ML
sequences.19 Hence, our ﬁnding that players do not diﬀerentiate their bids
19More speciﬁcally, two participants bid in treatment M −100 and −99 ECUs, while
the minimum bid of the remaining participants is 30 ECUs. Once we exclude these two
observations, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistic becomes insigniﬁcant (the p-value
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projects x and y by bidders 1 and 2.





x y x y
1 5 4 0 33 1 0 0 1
2 101 102 4 2 6 0 24 0
1 bM
2 (x) = 50 once, but x is provided.
2 bM
2 (y) = −20 once, but y is provided.
3 bY
1 (y) = −20 once, but y is provided.
4 bX
2 (x) = 60 once, but x is provided.
for x holds even when we restrict our attention to either the low-value or the
high-value bidders.
Finally, Table 2 reports the number of times (out of 16 + 16 = 32) that
the players’ bids satisfy condition (1) for vetoing a project.20 Project x in
treatment M is the most frequently vetoed project, and the low-value bidder
is the one that exercises his veto power more often. The players veto more
often in the MF than in the ML sequences. Note that even if the bids of one
group member satisfy condition (1), the project can be implemented if the
other group member overbids. The footnotes of Table 2 identify four such
cases.
5.1.2 Truthful bidding
Do players report their true values? Do mixed feelings aﬀect the extent of
truthful bidding? Does the discrepancy between the observed bids for x and
its true value depend on the presence of an alternative project? To address
these questions, we construct the following variable, representing the relative
deviation of the observed bid bT
i (p) (T = {M,X,Y }) from the true value
changes from 0.036 to 0.110, and could even change to 0.189 if we were to exclude a
further participant whose bid of 180 in treatment X is an outlier too).
20That is bT
1 (x) < −110, bT
2 (x) < 70 for vetoing x when T = M,X, and bT
1 (y) < −10,
bT
2 (y) < 30 for vetoing y when T = M,Y (see page 10).
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i (p) values in all treatments




MF sequences 55,5,4 59,1,4 59,2,3 59,2,3
ML sequences 51,5,8 54,4,6 49,8,7 55,4,5
Note: The table entries represent the numbers of negative, zero,
and positive RT









i (p) − vi(p))/vi(p) if i = 1 and p = x,
(bT
i (p) − vi(p))/vi(p) otherwise.
Table 3 shows that players rarely report their true values. Truthful bid-
ding typically ranges from 1.6% to 7.8%, rising once to 12.5% (sequences
ML, treatment X). In fact, in all cases, the majority of the RT
i (p) values are
negative, implying that people avoid dominated choices. On the other hand,
overbidding is often associated with outlier observations (the most relevant
example is one participant whose four bids equal 200 ECUs).21
Figure 4 plots the average values of the RT
i (p) series separately for v1 and
v2 bidders. The two types of bidders diﬀer substantially in their attitude
towards truthful bidding, and these diﬀerences often depend on the order in
which the treatments were played. Low-value bidders bid, on average, more
truthfully for x (i.e., their average RT
i (x) values are closer to zero) in the ML
than in the MF sequences. Experiencing at ﬁrst project x by itself seems
to help them realize its relative eﬃciency. On the other hand, compared to
MF, the ML sequences trigger, on average, more truthful bids for y from the
high-value bidders. Formal testing veriﬁes that the observed order eﬀects are
21We also conducted Wilcoxon signed rank tests to test the null hypothesis that the
true location of the various RT
i (p) series equals 0. In all cases the null hypothesis is clearly
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the series’ true location is less than 0
(all p-values < 0.01).
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Figure 4: Average relative deviations of observed bids from true values (1
stands for low-value and 2 for high-value bidders).
due to the high-value bidders.22
5.1.3 Benchmark bidding
The benchmark solutions are the equilibrium bids that equalize the players’
monetary payoﬀs. Table 4 reports, for each type of bidder, the averages of




i (p) − b∗
i(p)|/32. For both sequences, bids for x
tend to deviate more from the benchmark solutions than bids for y. This
22We used once again the Brunner et al. test to evaluate the hypothesis that the four
bM
1 (y) series have identical distributions. The p-value of the test statistic equals 0.28. The
p-value of the same test statistic using the bM
2 (y) series equals 0.0002.
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1 44.09 30.16 25.00 19.06
2 31.28 39.34 22.19 16.91
ML sequences
1 39.84 18.75 31.97 20.66
2 30.34 13.59 16.25 11.31
holds whether the two projects are oﬀered as alternatives or individually.
In addition, for x, competition from y results in larger deviations from the
benchmark solutions.
Deviations from the equal-payoﬀ equilibrium do not preclude bidders 1
and 2 from earning, on average, nearly the same. We use Table 5 to compare
their average earnings when either x or y is provided. Whenever the bidders
are given a choice of projects, the diﬀerence between π1(b) and π2(b) depends
on the order in which the treatments are played: if M is played at the
beginning of the sequence, high-value bidders earn, on average, substantially
more than low-value bidders (regardless of the provided project); if, on the
other hand, M is played at the end of the sequence and y is provided, the
average earnings of low-value and high-value bidders do not diﬀer much.
With only one project at stake, the average earnings of low-value and high-
value bidders diﬀer less in treatment Y than in treatment X (where the
high-value bidders earn noticeably more).
5.2 Frequencies of success and equilibrium play
We examine the provision rates of the two projects in order to assess whether
people provide x because of its (relative) eﬃciency, mixed feelings notwith-
standing. Table 6 displays the data observations that are needed for our
analysis (the maximum frequency for each of the table’s entries is 32).
Project x is provided rather frequently in treatment X (65.6% and 87.5%
20
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 034Table 5: Average earnings (in ECUs) per bidder under successful pro-
vision of either x or y.
Bidder





x y x y
1 17.1 −13.5 24.1 22.0 10.7 26.2 18.8 21.2
2 52.9 63.5 45.9 28.0 59.3 23.8 51.2 28.8
Note: The negative entry is the average of ﬁve values: 20, 7.5, -65, -55, and 25.
of the cases in the MF and ML sequences, respectively). According to tests of
equal proportions, we can not reject the null hypothesis that the probabilities
of provision of x in X and y in Y are the same (the p-values equal 1.00
and 0.73 for the MF and the ML sequences, respectively). These ﬁndings
make it clear that the presence of mixed feelings does not undermine the
provision of the most eﬃcient project. Further evidence of the participants’
preoccupation with eﬃciency is given by the fact that in M they provide x
more often than y.
Competition from a public good project aﬀects the provision of the project
that raises mixed feelings: x is provided less often in M than in X. We tested
the null hypothesis that the provision rates of x in M and X are the same,
against the alternative that the provision rate of x is less in M than in X: the
resulting p-value is close to the conventional 5% level for the MF sequences
(0.066), and well below it for the ML sequences (0.002).
The provision of a public project does not necessarily imply equilibrium




MF sequences 14 5 21 22
ML sequences 16 14 28 26
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 034Table 7: Simulated data: relative frequencies of equilib-
rium play and modal values of project surpluses.





x y x y
MF 4.10 7.81 5.37 8.69 20 0 10 10
ML 5.96 11.04 7.81 7.23 20 10 20 20
Note: 1024 pairs of bidders were used to calculate each table
entry.
play.23 With the aim of investigating how often the latter occurs, we con-
structed another (larger) dataset by successively pairing each type 1 bidder
with all type 2 bidders. Using the 1024 bid vectors that resulted from this
process (there are 32 bidders of each type in each pooled series), we com-
puted for each vector the projects’ surpluses according to bids, and used our
provision rule to determine which one of them, if any, should be provided.
The relative frequencies of equilibrium play that we arrived at, shown in Ta-
ble 7, imply that equilibrium play is a rather rare phenomenon: only once
does the relative frequency of equilibrium exceed 10%.
The ﬁnal columns of the table report the most frequently observed values
in the simulated surplus series. Only one mode coincides with equilibrium
(treatment M, sequence MF, project y). We also observe that in M, the
modes of x (both in MF and in ML) are larger than the modes of y, and
that in X and Y , the modes of the series in the two sequences are the same.
Thus, there are several modal values, not necessarily stable between se-
quences. In addition, these values diﬀer from the equilibrium values, which
are infrequent. It is essential to inspect the probability distribution of the
surplus variable.24 We are interested in the shape of the distribution (that is
23The reader is reminded that in treatments X and Y the provision equilibria require
that the surplus according to bids equals zero. In treatment M, b∗
1(p)+b∗
2(p)−C(p) = 0,
p = x,y must hold.
24Reporting modes makes sense with symmetric unimodal distributions, but can be
misleading when several values are about equally likely to be observed (as, for example,
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of change between treatments.
Figure 5 draws histograms of the surpluses according to bids of the pairs
of bidders that did provide a project.25 For project x, the highest-frequency
bin is either [10,20) (panel C) or [20,30) (panels A, B, and D). For project y,
in the case of M in the MF sequence (panel A), the histogram peaks at the
left edge (the mode of the 189 observations is once again zero), and then it
starts trailing oﬀ. In all other treatments (panels B, E, and F), we are given
the impression of a positively skewed distribution that peaks after the ﬁrst
bin, a ﬁnding that does not corroborate an equilibrium-like behavior.
6 Conclusions
By imposing a few intuitive requirements we derived a procedurally fair mech-
anism for determining which one of several public projects should be imple-
mented. Then, we concentrated on the simplest possible scenario, consisting
of two public projects and two bidders. The main aim of our experiment was
to explore whether a public project that raises mixed feelings (project x)
stands a fair chance of being provided in the face of competition from a
less eﬃcient public good (project y). We wanted to study, in the context of
our procedurally fair game form, the eﬀect of mixed feelings on bid levels,
provision frequencies, and equilibrium play.
Comparing the bid levels on x in the treatment where the two projects
compete with each other (treatment M) with the bid levels on the same
project in the treatment where it faces no competition (treatment X), we
ﬁnd that participants bid, on average, less in the former case than in the
latter (though the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant). The provision rate of x in
treatment X is considerably high (above 65%) and similar in magnitude to
the provision rate of y in the treatment where the standard public good
constitutes the sole available option (treatment Y ). Hence, it is rather the
with a sample of values drawn from a uniform distributions).
25For the purposes of a clearer graphical representation of the data, we do not display
their full range (0 to 370) but only the ﬁrst few histogram bins.
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Figure 5: Simulated data: surplus histograms of provided projects.
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mixed feelings that should be held responsible for the provision failure of
x in X. Treatment M provides further evidence that people assign little
importance to mixed feelings: the public project that raises mixed feelings is
implemented more often than the alternative public good.
Our analysis of equilibrium play indicates that it occurs rarely. Even
with simulated data, the obtained proportions of equilibrium play do not
corroborate an equilibrium-like behavior, with the exception of project y in
treatment M, sequence MF.
The eﬀect of mixed feelings on bid choices is apparently weak. Bidders
(especially the low-value ones) veto the project that raises mixed feelings
more often than the public good project, but the exercise of veto power is
far from common practice. In comparison to bids on y, bids on x tend to
deviate more from the equilibrium bids that equalize the players’ monetary
payoﬀs. Albeit the equal-payoﬀ equilibrium is uncommon, an outcome which
is hardly surprising given that ours is the worst-case scenario for observing
fair outcomes.
The bidders’ unwillingness to veto the project that raises mixed feelings
suggests that people do not attempt to impose their will on others.26 If the
agent that attaches a negative value to project x is suﬃciently compensated
by the other party, then he has no reason to reject an agreement a priori.
We therefore conclude that the presence of mixed feelings is not detrimental
to cooperation, provided of course (as we assume here) that the project that
raises these feelings is relatively eﬃcient, and that the party that regards
the project as “meat” is willing to compensate the party that regards it as
“poison”.
Finally, we detected an interesting order eﬀect: experiencing each project
separately before having to opt for either one of them induces the high-value
bidders to signiﬁcantly increase their bids on the public good. Playing treat-
ment M at the end, rather than at the beginning, has further consequence.
First, low-value bidders bid more truthfully on the project that raises mixed
feelings, possibly because they understood more thoroughly its relative eﬃ-
26This is consistent with James M. Buchanan’s 1975 contractarian paradigm.
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projects more often. More research is necessary for the generalization of our
ﬁndings. But the experimental evidence garnered from the simple scenario
that we considered suggests that the extent of coordination failure could be
reduced, and consequently Pareto improvements could be achieved, if we
were to oﬀer one project at a time before oﬀering them as alternatives.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 034A1 For Online Publication: Experimental instructions
This appendix reports the instructions (originally in German) that we used for the sequence
MXY . The instructions for the other sequences were adapted accordingly and are available
upon request.
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max Planck Institute
of Economics. Please switch o your mobile(s) and remain silent. It is strictly forbidden to
talk to other participants. Please raise your hand whenever you have a question; one of the
experimenters will come to your aid.
You will receive e5.00 for showing up on time. Besides this, you can earn more. But
there is also a small possibility of ending up with a loss. The show-up fee and any additional
amounts of money you may earn will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Payments are carried out privately, i.e., the others will not see your earnings.
In the course of the experiment, we shall speak of ECUs (Experimental Currency Unit)
rather than euros. The conversion rate is 5 ECUs per euro.
The experiment consists of three parts. The instructions for the rst part follow below.
The instructions for the second part will be distributed after all participants have completed
the rst part, and the instructions for the third part will be distributed after all participants
have completed the second part.
Detailed information on the rst part
You will be placed in a group of two persons (a pair). We will refer to the other person in
your pair as the other. You and the other will face a one-shot situation involving two public
projects, namely projects X and Y . Both of you will decide if one or none of the two projects
will be realized. (The rules determining which project, if any, will be realized are described
below.)
Cost of and gain from each project
Each project has a provision cost; providing X costs 30 ECUs and providing Y costs 70
ECUs. In addition, each pair member gets a certain personal gain from each project. From
project X, one member of the pair loses 40 ECUs (i.e., his/her \gain" is  40 ECUs) and the
other gains 140 ECUs. From project Y , the two members of the pair gain either 40 or 80
ECUs. Just for convenience, the characteristics of each individual project are summarized in
the following table.
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X 30 either -40 or 140
Y 70 either 40 or 80
The gains that you and the other get from the projects are predetermined (you learn them
at the beginning of the experiment):
 With 50% probability you will be the pair member gaining less from both projects (i.e.,
you will gain  40 from X and 40 from Y ) and the other will be the pair member gaining
more from both projects (i.e., 140 from X and 80 from Y ).
 With 50% probability you will be the pair member gaining more from both projects
(i.e., 140 from X and 80 from Y ) and the other the one gaining less (i.e.,  40 from X
and 40 from Y ).
It follows that one pair member (that is either you or the other) gains less than the other
from both projects and has even a negative gain from X.
Your decision
Having learned what you and the other gain from the projects, you will need to determine
your bids on X and Y . Regardless of your gains from the projects, your bids can be any
integer number between  200 and 200 ECUs (i.e.,  200; 199; 198;:::;198;199;200).
Rules for the provision of a project
Given the costs of the projects, whether and which project will be realized depends on the
total number of ECUs that you and the other bid on each project. We will refer to the
dierence between the sum of bids made by you and the other on a certain project and the
provision cost of that project as the \surplus from the project". Thus:
Surplus from X = (Your bid on X + The other's bid on X)   30.
Surplus from Y = (Your bid on Y + The other's bid on Y)   70.
A project can be realized only if the surplus that it generates is either positive or zero
(in other words if the sum of bids made by you and the other either exceeds or equals the
project's cost). A project can not be realized if the surplus that it generates is negative
(that is if the sum of bids made by you and the other is less than the project's cost). If
both projects generate a non-negative surplus, then the one generating the higher surplus is
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the same non-negative surplus).
To sum up, the following outcomes are possible:
Outcome Surplus from X Surplus from Y Realized project
1 negative negative none
2 negative zero or positive project Y
3 zero or positive negative project X
4 zero or positive zero or positive higher surplus-generating project
Your experimental earnings
Your earnings depend on whether and which project is realized.
 If no project is realized, you and the other get nothing.
 If one of the two projects is realized,
{ you are paid your gain from the project,
{ you pay your bid on the project if your bid is positive or collect a compensation
equal to your bid if your bid is negative,
{ you receive half the surplus from the project (the other half goes to the other).
Thus, in case that X is realized, your earnings are calculated as follows:
your gain from X   your bid on X + half of the surplus from X
( 40 or 140)   (integer within  200 to 200) + 1=2  (sum of bids on X   30)
Similarly, in case that Y is realized, your earnings are calculated as follows:
your gain from Y   your bid on Y + half of the surplus from Y
(40 or 80)   (integer within  200 to 200) + 1=2  (sum of bids on Y   70)
Note that if your bid on the realized project exceeds the gain you get from that project,
then your earnings could be negative, i.e., you may suer a loss.
The following examples should help you better understand the calculation of your earnings.
Example 1
Suppose that your gains from projects X and Y are  40 and 40, respectively. If you bid
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from project X" equals ( 50 + 120)   30 = 40 and the \surplus from project Y " equals
(10 + 40)   70 =  20. Consequently, project X is realized and your earnings amount to
 40   ( 50) + 1=2  40 =  40 + 50 + 20 = 30 ECUs.
Example 2
Suppose once again that your gains from projects X and Y are  40 and 40, respectively. If
you bid 0 on X and 50 on Y , and the other bids 90 on X and 40 on Y , then the \surplus from
project X" equals (0+90) 30 = 60 and the \surplus from project Y " equals (50+40) 70 =
20. Consequently, project X is realized and your earnings amount to  40 0+1=260 =  10
ECUs. You suered this loss because your bid on X (i.e., 0) is more than your gain from X
(i.e.,  40).
Example 3
Suppose once again that your gains from projects X and Y are  40 and 40, respectively.
If you bid  80 on X and 20 on Y , and the other bids 120 on X and 70 on Y , then the
\surplus from project X" equals ( 80 + 120)   30 = 10 and the \surplus from project Y "
equals (20+70)  70 = 20. Consequently, project Y is realized and your earnings amount to
40   20 + 1=2  20 = 30 ECUs.
Timing of provided information
You will be informed about the other's choices in this part only after the end of the session.
Thus, you will learn
1. the other's bids in the rst part,
2. which project, if any, is realized in the rst part, and
3. your experimental earnings in the rst part
on completion of the third part of the experiment.
Your nal payo
At the end of the experiment, one experimenter will randomly select one participant by
drawing a ball from an urn that contains as many balls as the number of participants. This
participant will in his turn randomly select one of the three parts of the experiment by drawing
a ball from an urn containing three balls numbered 1 to 3. The experimental earnings that
correspond to this part will be converted to euros and paid out in cash.
In case of a negative payo, losses up to e5.00 (= 25 ECUs) will be covered by your
show-up fee. There are two alternatives concerning losses in excess of e5.00. The rst is to
pay the dierence from your own money. The second is to pay the dierence by performing
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in a lengthy text. You will be compensated with e1.00 for each correctly counted sentence.
The drill is introduced to allow you to repay your losses; there is no way of earning extra
money from it.
Summary
 You will be paired with the other.
 You will face projects X and Y , with costs 30 and 70 ECUs, respectively.
 The computer will determine whether you gain  40 ECUs from X and 40 ECUs from
Y , or you gain 140 ECUs from X and 80 ECUs from Y .
 You will have to decide how much to bid on each project. Your bids must be integers
between  200 and +200 ECUs.
 If we dene the surplus from a project as the dierence between your pair's sum of bids
on the project and the provision cost of that project, then
{ If \surplus from X" and \surplus from Y " are both negative:
 no project will be realized, and
 your experimental earnings will be zero.
{ If \surplus from X" is negative and \surplus from Y " is zero or positive:
 project Y will be realized, and
 your experimental earnings will be:
your gain from Y   your bid on Y + one-half of the surplus from Y .
{ If \surplus from X" is zero or positive and \surplus from Y " is negative:
 project X will be realized, and
 your experimental earnings will be
your gain from X   your bid on X + one-half of the surplus from X.
{ If \surplus from X" and \surplus from Y " are both zero or positive:
 the project generating the higher surplus will be realized (a random draw will
determine the project to be realized if the surpluses are equal), and
 your experimental earnings will be:
your gain from the realized project   your bid on the realized project
+ one-half of the surplus from the realized project.
Before starting you will have to answer some control questions which will ensure your
understanding of these rules. Once everybody has answered all questions correctly, three
practice rounds will help you familiarize yourself with the dynamics of the experiment. In
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values. The result of these rounds will not be relevant to your nal payo.
Please remain quietly seated during the whole experiment. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand now. Please click \ok" on your computer screen when you have nished
reading the instructions of this part of the experiment.
Detailed information on the second part
You will face a situation similar to that encountered in the rst part. But now
B only project X can be realized, and
B the participant you are matched with (i.e., the other) is a dierent one.
As before:
 the overall cost of X is 30 ECUs;
 the gain that you and the other get from X is either  40 or 140 ECUs. Be aware that
your gain from X in this part will be identical to your gain from X in the rst part
(i.e.,  40 if you previously gained  40, and 140 if you previously gained 140);
 you (as well as the other) have to place a bid on X (the bid can be any integer between
 200 and +200 ECUs);
 project X will be realized only if \surplus from X" is either zero or positive (i.e., if the
bids made by you and the other suce to cover the project's cost).
The following outcomes are possible:
 If \surplus from X" is negative, then
{ X will not be realized, and
{ your experimental earnings will be zero.
 If \surplus from X" is zero or positive, then
{ X will be realized, and
{ your experimental earnings will be:
your gain from X   your bid on X + half of the surplus from X
( 40 or 140)   (integer within  200 to 200) + 1=2  (sum of bids on X   30)
Please note that you may once again suer a loss if your bid on X exceeds your prede-
termined gain from X.
As with the previous part,
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experimental earnings will be provided after the end of the session;
 control questions and practice rounds will help you familiarize yourself with the rules and
dynamics of this part of the experiment (the structure of the practice rounds remains
the same: the computer determines randomly the other's decisions and the result are
not relevant to your nal payo).
Please click \ok" if you have nished reading the instructions for the present part and
have no further questions.
Detailed information on the third part
The third part of the experiment resembles the previous two. But now
B only project Y can be realized, and
B the participant you are matched with (i.e., the other) is someone you have never before
interacted with.
As before:
 the overall cost of Y is 70 ECUs;
 the gain that you and the other get from Y is either 40 or 80 ECUs. Be aware that your
gain from Y in this part will be identical to your gain from Y in the rst part (i.e., 40
if you previously gained 40, and 80 if you previously gained 80);
 you (as well as the other) have to place a bid on Y (the bid can be any integer between
 200 and +200 ECUs);
 project Y will be realized only if \surplus from Y " is either zero or positive (i.e., if the
bids made by you and the other suce to cover the project's cost).
The following outcomes are possible:
 If \surplus from Y " is negative, then
{ Y will not be realized, and
{ your experimental earnings will be zero.
 If \surplus from Y " is zero or positive, then
{ Y will be realized, and
{ your experimental earnings will be:
your gain from Y   your bid on Y + half of the surplus from Y
(40 or 80)   (integer within  200 to 200) + 1=2  (sum of bids on Y   70)
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mined gain from Y .
Control questions and practice rounds will help you familiarize yourself with the rules
and dynamics of this part of the experiment (the structure of the practice rounds remains the
same: the computer determines randomly the other's decisions and the result are not relevant
to your nal payo).
Please click \ok" if you have nished reading the instructions for the present part and
have no further questions.
A2 For Online Publication: Raw data
The following tables document our raw data (arranged by session). In all tables, Sb
p denotes
the surplus according to bids of project p.
For the interested reader, we identify here the individual bidders that we referred to in
the main text:
 Participants 21 of session 3 and 11 of session 4 bid in treatment M  100 and  99 ECUs,
respectively (footnote 23).
 The participant whose bid of 180 in treatment X is an outlier too (same footnote) is
participant 16 of session 3.
 The participant whose four bids equal 200 ECUs (page 17, discussion on overbidding
and outlier observations) is the 25th participant of the second session.
 The four cases where the project is provided with the bids of one pair member satisfying
condition (1) and the payo of the other pair member being negative (Table 2, footnotes)
are:
{ MF, Session 2, participant 18 (group 2): bM
2 (x) = 50 but x is provided,
{ MF, Session 2, participant 23 (group 12): bM
2 (y) =  20 but y is provided,
{ ML, Session 1, participant 24 (group 11): bY
1 (y) =  20 but y is provided, and
{ MF, Session 4, participant 21 (group 11): bX
2 (x) = 60 but x is provided.
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1 29 1 -200 200 -120 190 y -65.00
21 2 110 60 115.00
2 26 1 -60 -100 10 -125 x 25.00
6 2 100 45 45.00
3 13 1 -70 20 -50 0 y 20.00
2 2 50 50 30.00
4 25 1 -200 35 -130 5 y 7.50
18 2 100 40 42.50
5 1 1 -200 10 -160 -20 - 0.00
22 2 70 40 0.00
6 14 1 -40 30 15 5 x 7.50
31 2 85 45 62.50
7 11 1 0 35 -5 -5 - 0.00
27 2 25 30 0.00
8 28 1 -50 50 -75 -15 - 0.00
4 2 5 5 0.00
9 24 1 -40 -10 -10 -180 - 0.00
8 2 60 -100 0.00
10 16 1 0 5 50 -15 x -15.00
5 2 80 50 85.00
11 7 1 -80 20 -10 -20 - 0.00
9 2 100 30 0.00
12 20 1 -70 15 -40 -75 - 0.00
23 2 60 -20 0.00
13 3 1 -60 10 10 -10 x 25.00
19 2 100 50 45.00
14 10 1 -80 -20 -10 -50 - 0.00
17 2 100 40 0.00
15 30 1 -60 20 10 -10 x 25.00
32 2 100 40 45.00
16 15 1 -50 10 -30 -10 - 0.00
12 2 50 50 0.00
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1 15 1 -60 10 x 25.00
21 2 100 45.00
2 29 1 -60 10 x 25.00
6 2 100 45.00
3 26 1 -60 -40 - 0.00
2 2 50 0.00
4 13 1 -60 10 x 25.00
18 2 100 45.00
5 25 1 -45 125 x 67.50
22 2 200 2.50
6 1 1 -100 -25 - 0.00
31 2 105 0.00
7 14 1 -50 -38 - 0.00
27 2 42 0.00
8 11 1 -50 20 x 20.00
4 2 100 50.00
9 28 1 -60 20 x 30.00
8 2 110 40.00
10 24 1 -60 10 x 25.00
5 2 100 45.00
11 16 1 -40 30 x 15.00
9 2 100 55.00
12 7 1 -80 -16 - 0.00
23 2 94 0.00
13 20 1 -65 25 x 37.50
19 2 120 32.50
14 3 1 -60 20 x 30.00
17 2 110 40.00
15 10 1 -65 5 x 27.50
32 2 100 42.50
16 30 1 -45 15 x 12.50
12 2 90 57.50
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1 30 1 25 15 y 22.50
21 2 60 27.50
2 15 1 10 -5 - 0.00
6 2 55 0.00
3 29 1 0 -20 - 0.00
2 2 50 0.00
4 26 1 30 10 y 15.00
18 2 50 35.00
5 13 1 10 20 y 40.00
22 2 80 10.00
6 25 1 25 15 y 22.50
31 2 60 27.50
7 1 1 -70 -115 - 0.00
27 2 25 0.00
8 14 1 25 15 y 22.50
4 2 60 27.50
9 11 1 35 25 y 17.50
8 2 60 32.50
10 28 1 30 20 y 20.00
5 2 60 30.00
11 24 1 -20 10 y 65.00
9 2 100 -15.00
12 16 1 5 -3 - 0.00
23 2 62 0.00
13 7 1 15 5 y 27.50
19 2 60 22.50
14 20 1 20 5 y 22.50
17 2 55 27.50
15 3 1 15 -15 - 0.00
32 2 40 0.00
16 10 1 20 5 y 22.50
12 2 55 27.50
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1 32 1 -60 20 110 -250 x 75.00
14 2 200 -200 -5.00
2 25 1 200 200 220 180 x -130.00
18 2 50 50 200.00
3 13 1 -50 30 40 -90 x 30.00
5 2 120 -50 40.00
4 30 1 -200 10 -90 -20 - 0.00
6 2 140 40 0.00
5 20 1 -50 30 -20 -70 - 0.00
19 2 60 -30 0.00
6 9 1 -75 -35 15 -40 x 42.50
11 2 120 65 27.50
7 8 1 -40 40 60 40 x 30.00
27 2 130 70 40.00
8 22 1 -65 15 -20 -85 - 0.00
4 2 75 -30 0.00
9 1 1 -60 20 40 -80 x 40.00
10 2 130 -30 30.00
10 24 1 -59 25 1 -15 x 19.50
21 2 90 30 50.50
11 28 1 -50 25 -20 -25 - 0.00
17 2 60 20 0.00
12 7 1 -100 100 -80 10 y -55.00
23 2 50 -20 105.00
13 26 1 -50 30 20 0 x 20.00
29 2 100 40 50.00
14 3 1 -140 -20 -59 -39 - 0.00
2 2 111 51 0.00
15 15 1 -60 25 50 15 x 45.00
31 2 140 60 25.00
16 12 1 -70 20 10 10 y 25.00
16 2 110 60 25.00
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1 12 1 20 30 y 35.00
14 2 80 15.00
2 32 1 11 -209 - 0.00
18 2 -150 0.00
3 25 1 200 230 y -45.00
5 2 100 95.00
4 13 1 30 10 y 15.00
6 2 50 35.00
5 30 1 10 -15 - 0.00
19 2 45 0.00
6 20 1 30 30 y 25.00
11 2 70 25.00
7 9 1 -35 -26 - 0.00
27 2 79 0.00
8 8 1 20 5 y 22.50
4 2 55 27.50
9 22 1 20 20 y 30.00
10 2 70 20.00
10 1 1 20 5 y 22.50
21 2 55 27.50
11 24 1 25 15 y 22.50
17 2 60 27.50
12 28 1 25 5 y 17.50
23 2 50 32.50
13 7 1 0 -20 - 0.00
29 2 50 0.00
14 26 1 25 5 y 17.50
2 2 50 32.50
15 3 1 -10 -40 - 0.00
31 2 40 0.00
16 15 1 16 1 y 24.50
16 2 55 25.50
41
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 034Table 13: Session 2 (sequence MY X), treatment X.





1 15 1 -45 65 x 37.50
14 2 140 32.50
2 12 1 -70 0 x 30.00
18 2 100 40.00
3 32 1 -65 75 x 62.50
5 2 170 7.50
4 25 1 200 250 x -115.00
6 2 80 185.00
5 13 1 -50 20 x 20.00
19 2 100 50.00
6 30 1 -55 35 x 32.50
11 2 120 37.50
7 20 1 -50 59 x 39.50
27 2 139 30.50
8 9 1 -75 -30 - 0.00
4 2 75 0.00
9 8 1 -70 -19 - 0.00
10 2 81 0.00
10 22 1 -65 -5 - 0.00
21 2 90 0.00
11 1 1 -60 40 x 40.00
17 2 130 30.00
12 24 1 -60 -30 - 0.00
23 2 60 0.00
13 28 1 -60 -13 - 0.00
29 2 77 0.00
14 7 1 -50 20 x 20.00
2 2 100 50.00
15 26 1 -55 -35 - 0.00
31 2 50 0.00
16 3 1 -80 -5 - 0.00
16 2 105 0.00
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1 32 1 -50 30 x 25.00
28 2 110 45.00
2 18 1 -60 15 x 27.50
14 2 105 42.50
3 3 1 -40 110 x 55.00
16 2 180 15.00
4 29 1 0 90 x 5.00
24 2 120 65.00
5 2 1 40 115 x -22.50
26 2 105 92.50
6 20 1 -30 20 x 0.00
7 2 80 70.00
7 31 1 -50 60 x 40.00
10 2 140 30.00
8 13 1 -50 10 x 15.00
9 2 90 55.00
9 8 1 -80 -10 - 0.00
11 2 100 0.00
10 6 1 100 180 x -50.00
4 2 110 120.00
11 5 1 -40 50 x 25.00
22 2 120 45.00
12 23 1 -40 0 x 0.00
1 2 70 70.00
13 15 1 -60 10 x 25.00
17 2 100 45.00
14 27 1 -60 10 x 25.00
30 2 100 45.00
15 12 1 -60 10 x 25.00
25 2 100 45.00
16 19 1 -47 33 x 23.50
21 2 110 46.50
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1 19 1 0 -10 - 0.00
28 2 60 0.00
2 32 1 30 15 y 17.50
14 2 55 32.50
3 18 1 40 110 y 55.00
16 2 140 -5.00
4 3 1 40 50 y 25.00
24 2 80 25.00
5 29 1 50 35 y 7.50
26 2 55 42.50
6 2 1 20 1 y 20.50
7 2 51 29.50
7 20 1 30 10 y 15.00
10 2 50 35.00
8 31 1 50 50 y 15.00
9 2 70 35.00
9 13 1 20 5 y 22.50
11 2 55 27.50
10 8 1 15 10 y 30.00
4 2 65 20.00
11 6 1 100 90 y -15.00
22 2 60 65.00
12 5 1 30 20 y 20.00
1 2 60 30.00
13 23 1 10 -10 - 0.00
17 2 50 0.00
14 15 1 20 0 y 20.00
30 2 50 30.00
15 27 1 -150 -145 - 0.00
25 2 75 0.00
16 12 1 30 33 y 26.50
21 2 73 23.50
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1 12 1 -50 30 20 10 x 20.00
28 2 100 50 50.00
2 19 1 -40 0 35 -25 x 17.50
14 2 105 45 52.50
3 32 1 -50 30 -10 100 y 60.00
16 2 70 140 -10.00
4 18 1 -65 30 35 35 y 27.50
24 2 130 75 22.50
5 3 1 -40 40 36 25 x 18.00
26 2 106 55 52.00
6 29 1 200 200 260 180 x -110.00
7 2 90 50 180.00
7 2 1 0 20 80 0 x 0.00
10 2 110 50 70.00
8 20 1 -30 20 40 20 x 10.00
9 2 100 70 60.00
9 31 1 -50 40 20 20 x 20.00
11 2 100 50 50.00
10 13 1 -50 20 40 15 x 30.00
4 2 120 65 40.00
11 8 1 -75 15 15 5 x 42.50
22 2 120 60 27.50
12 6 1 50 60 125 50 x -27.50
1 2 105 60 97.50
13 5 1 -40 40 10 20 y 10.00
17 2 80 50 40.00
14 23 1 -20 10 30 -20 x -5.00
30 2 80 40 75.00
15 15 1 -50 20 20 25 y 32.50
25 2 100 75 17.50
16 27 1 -200 50 -330 53 y 16.50
21 2 -100 73 33.50
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1 8 1 25 10 y 20.00
18 2 55 30.00
2 12 1 25 -5 - 0.00
10 2 40 0.00
3 29 1 20 0 y 20.00
1 2 50 30.00
4 7 1 20 20 y 30.00
13 2 70 20.00
5 5 1 40 30 y 15.00
6 2 60 35.00
6 17 1 30 15 y 17.50
15 2 55 32.50
7 24 1 35 55 y 32.50
11 2 90 17.50
8 19 1 35 25 y 17.50
4 2 60 32.50
9 23 1 35 25 y 17.50
31 2 60 32.50
10 22 1 20 20 y 30.00
30 2 70 20.00
11 14 1 21 -9 - 0.00
21 2 40 0.00
12 3 1 30 -10 - 0.00
9 2 30 0.00
13 26 1 10 0 y 30.00
20 2 60 20.00
14 28 1 30 20 y 20.00
16 2 60 30.00
15 27 1 30 20 y 20.00
2 2 60 30.00
16 25 1 20 5 y 22.50
32 2 55 27.50
46
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 034Table 18: Session 4 (sequence Y XM), treatment X.





1 25 1 -60 10 x 25.00
18 2 100 45.00
2 8 1 -40 -10 - 0.00
10 2 60 0.00
3 12 1 -40 30 x 15.00
1 2 100 55.00
4 29 1 -70 40 x 50.00
13 2 140 20.00
5 7 1 -60 30 x 35.00
6 2 120 35.00
6 5 1 -50 25 x 22.50
15 2 105 47.50
7 17 1 -70 -15 - 0.00
11 2 85 0.00
8 24 1 -70 40 x 50.00
4 2 140 20.00
9 19 1 -20 50 x 5.00
31 2 100 65.00
10 23 1 -50 10 x 15.00
30 2 90 55.00
11 22 1 -20 10 x -15.00
21 2 60 85.00
12 14 1 -65 5 x 27.50
9 2 100 42.50
13 3 1 -80 -20 - 0.00
20 2 90 0.00
14 26 1 -50 10 x 15.00
16 2 90 55.00
15 28 1 -70 10 x 35.00
2 2 110 35.00
16 27 1 -55 25 x 27.50
32 2 110 42.50
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1 27 1 -65 35 5 20 y 15.00
18 2 100 55 35.00
2 25 1 -60 20 -30 -10 - 0.00
10 2 60 40 0.00
3 8 1 -40 30 30 10 x 15.00
1 2 100 50 55.00
4 12 1 -35 35 5 65 y 37.50
13 2 70 100 12.50
5 29 1 -70 20 0 10 y 25.00
6 2 100 60 25.00
6 7 1 -65 25 10 -5 x 30.00
15 2 105 40 40.00
7 5 1 -50 30 -179 20 y 20.00
11 2 -99 60 30.00
8 17 1 -70 30 40 20 x 50.00
4 2 140 60 20.00
9 24 1 -60 25 10 15 y 22.50
31 2 100 60 27.50
10 19 1 -25 25 -20 45 y 37.50
30 2 35 90 12.50
11 23 1 -50 35 -20 5 y 7.50
21 2 60 40 42.50
12 22 1 -20 20 -20 30 y 35.00
9 2 30 80 15.00
13 14 1 -75 10 -25 -10 - 0.00
20 2 80 50 0.00
14 3 1 -80 30 -15 20 y 20.00
16 2 95 60 30.00
15 26 1 -45 10 41 -22 x 25.50
2 2 116 38 44.50
16 28 1 -65 15 20 -5 x 35.00
32 2 115 50 35.00
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